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Understanding construction consortia:
theory, practice and opinions
Stephen Gruneberg and Will Hughes (University of Reading, UK) 
Abstract
Firms form consortia in order to win contracts.  Once a project has been awarded to a consortium each member then concentrates
on his or her own contract with the client.  Therefore, consortia are marketing devices, which present the impression of team-
working, but the production process is just as fragmented as under conventional procurement methods.  In this way, the consortium
forms a barrier between the client and the actual construction production process.
l Firms form consortia, not as a simple development of normal ways of working, but because the circumstances for specific
projects make it a necessary vehicle.  These circumstances include projects that are too large or too complex to undertake alone
or projects that require on-going services which cannot be provided by the individual firms in-house.  
l It is not a preferred way of working, because participants carry extra risk in the form of liability for the actions of their partners in
the consortium.
l The behaviour of members of consortia is determined by their relative power, based on several factors, including financial
commitment and ease of replacement.
l The level of supply chain visibility to the public sector client and to the industry is reduced by the existence of a consortium
because the consortium forms an additional obstacle between the client and the firms undertaking the actual construction work.
Supply chain visibility matters to the client who otherwise loses control over the process of construction or service provision,
while remaining accountable for cost overruns. To overcome this separation there is a convincing argument in favour of adopting
the approach put forward in the Project Partnering Contract 2000 (PPC2000) Agreement.
l Members of consortia do not necessarily go on to work in the same consortia again because members need to respond flexibly
to opportunities as and when they arise.
l Decision-making processes within consortia tend to be on an ad hoc basis.
l Construction risk is taken by the contractor and the construction supply chain but the reputational risk is carried by all the firms
associated with a consortium.
l There is a wide variation in the manner that consortia are formed, determined by the individual circumstances of each project; its
requirements, size and complexity, and the attitude of individual project leaders.  However, there are a number of close working
relationships based on generic models of consortia-like arrangements for the purpose of building production, such as the
Housing Corporation Guidance Notes and the PPC2000.
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The contractual environment
onstruction consortia arise in several
different forms. They are one of many
ways in which traditionally separate
parts of the construction procurement process
might be integrated.  Sometimes, this
integration involves a single firm taking on
obligations wider than it is capable of
undertaking alone, and then subcontracting
elements of the work; at other times, groups of
firms get together to act as a consortium to
meet the needs of a client. 
An example of such arrangements, which may
involve a number of firms with different areas
of expertise, is design-build-finance-operate
(DBFO). DBFO essentially provides a
complete private sector service (or the
services of a building), which the public sector
agrees to purchase over an extended period.
In DBFO projects the commercial risk is
nominally taken by the private sector operator.
The public sector client only undertakes to
purchase the output over a given period.  At
the end of the contract, the assets remain with
the operator.  Similar arrangements may
involve the transfer of the built assets to the
public sector client at the end of an agreed
period, such as build-own-operate-transfer
(BOOT), which has long been used to realise
major construction projects, especially in less
developed countries.
Public sector procurement and
the construction sector
Construction procurement by the public sector
has long been seen as a problematic. A recent
report (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
2003: 12) expressed concern over traditional
approaches to procurement by local
authorities.  According to the Office of the
Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), the traditional
interface between clients and contractors and
the management of contracts often caused
problems, which constrained innovation and
inhibited the use of external suppliers. For high
value and high risk projects, the ODPM (2003:
p18) suggested that local government might
adopt partnering as an alternative approach.  
Firms often form consortia to provide large
and complex public sector projects.  These
appear to be relatively efficient and effective.
Hence, once a public sector client has decided
that a major project is needed, it will often
engage a consortium with sufficient financial
backing and technical expertise in construction
to carry out the work.
It seems reasonable to assume that, by using a
consortium, a team could be employed which
would work together to solve problems, reduce
costs and lower risks.  At the same time,
quality issues could be addressed; all this
could be achieved in a shorter period than with
traditional procurement methods.  Moreover,
not only could the consortium carry out the
building work, the same arrangement could be
used to deliver services, including facilities
management, after the construction phase.
One of the purposes of this report is to test
the validity of such aspirations, and the extent
to which they are matched in practice.
Government has encouraged construction
firms to work in teams and has involved private
sector finance in the funding process through
its Private Finance Initiative (PFI).  In response
to this approach, Special Purpose Vehicles
1 Introduction
RICS Research      l        5www.rics.org/research
Understanding construction consortia: theory, practice and opinions
c
(SPVs) are set up to structure the delivery
once a contract has been agreed.  But before
a contract can be agreed, informal consortia
may be formed, combining banking, property
and construction companies.  Only when one
of these informal consortia wins a bid is an
SPV formally established.  Several methods of
public procurement have emerged under the
umbrella of PFI, including Prime Contracting
for MoD projects, Procure 21 for NHS projects
and Framework Agreements for schools and
other types of building.  
These initiatives usually involve structures that
penetrate the supply chain.  In Prime
Contracting there are clusters of firms
supplying the cluster group leader or Prime
Contractor.  Each of the clusters has clusters
of other firms supplying the specialist firms.
Under Procure 21, Primary Supply Chain
Partnerships (PSCPs) have been set up.
These PSCPs are construction consortia,
which have pre-qualified for NHS projects.
There are only 12 PSCPs for the whole of
England.  However, in a case study of Procure
21 carried out by Proverbs and Riley (2003),
caution was expressed.  Proverbs and Riley
found little awareness among NHS Trust staff
of the supply chain companies and although
NHS Estates advertised Procure 21 widely,
individual members of staff were not generally
prepared for the new system of procurement
when it was launched.
Framework Agreements are deemed to be
contracts in order to comply with EU directives.
The framework sets up arrangements for
suppliers to work together over a period, or
over a number of building projects.  These
agreements enable firms to undertake a series
of smaller projects, such as school building, on
6 l  RICS Research
In construction there has always been co-operation
and a problem solving ethos; otherwise buildngs
could never have been built.
behalf of the same client body or local
authority.
The use of consortia in construction does not
necessarily mean that construction firms could
not work together outside consortia.  In
construction there has always been co-
operation and a problem-solving ethos;
otherwise buildings could never have been
built.  Indeed, as reported below, one
interviewee argued that, in view of this
traditional method of firms working together, it
would be difficult to find any advantages in
setting up consortia in construction: in any
case, the incentives in consortia are in all the
wrong places.  For example, one of the major
contradictions facing construction firms
working in consortia with long-term
undertakings is that building contractors, and
even many property developers, only have a
short-term interest in any project, up to the
end of the construction phase, and then they
sell it on.
Nevertheless, the management of risk may be
one factor leading to the formation of
consortia. In construction projects it is always
possible to find someone else to blame.  It
might be argued that one of the main reasons
for the formation of a consortium is because it
is not possible to parcel up risks.  The
members of a consortium are forced into the
position of trusting others to make commercial
decisions on their behalf, which they are going
to be held to, because in principle, though not
necessarily, they are all jointly and severally
liable.  In practice, ultimately, the client or
individual parties carry the risks at present.
For this reason consultancy firms and others
carry professional indemnity insurance.
Issues and questions
The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
(2003: p24) identified a number of methods of
procurement of particular relevance to local
government, including potential partnership
models, that required further study and
research.  Partnership models are examples of
consortia in construction. The questions raised
in this discussion concern the formation,
composition and operation of consortia in
construction.  Are construction consortia
indeed effective and efficient or are they
purely marketing devices adding little value to
the process?  This study examines questions
about the working of consortia in public sector
projects.  The main objectives of the research
are to:
l examine the formation of consortia in the
construction industry,
l examine the roles and relationships of the
members of consortia,
l understand the motives and strategies of
firms in construction consortia,
l examine the working practices of firms in
consortia,
l examine the manner in which consortia are
used to mobilise productive resources,
l examine risk and sources of conflict in     
construction consortia, and
l consider the operational differences
between integrated supply teams and
consortia.
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This study focuses on those situations in
which several firms combine to provide a
building or structure as a complete contract, or
as part of a contract to provide services to
government acting as client on behalf of the
public.  This would include those projects
involving construction either financed through
traditional public sector funding means or
through PFI.
The public sector work undertaken by the
construction industry shares many of the
economic characteristics of the construction
industry in general. Hillebrandt (1984) points
out that the construction sector has many
economic features, which it shares with other
industries but in combination, distinguish it
from them.  Raftery (1991) points out the
bulkiness and low value-to-weight ratio of
materials, the high labour content of output,
the low levels of fixed costs and the high level
of subcontracting in construction.  Gruneberg
(2000) highlights the size of construction
projects relative to the turnover of contractors.
Each project is therefore an opportunity to
generate profits but is also a threat to the
survival of the firm if problems emerge.  If
problems emerge, such as cost overruns,
delays, technical difficulties, and late payment,
losses on any one project can be greater than
the profits of a firm’s other projects and its
capital assets. These characteristics often
form barriers to building efficiently and
effectively both in the public and private
sectors.  Several public sector projects
(Portcullis House and the British Library are
but two examples of some of the larger
projects) have encountered management and
funding difficulties.  These characteristics are
often the main reason for cost over-runs and
building delays especially in the public sector.
There is no reason why they cannot be
managed, but as yet they have often appeared
to involve intractable difficulties. 
One feature of the building production process
of particular relevance to public sector
construction procurement is that large
construction projects are usually carried out by
a number of construction firms, often as many
as 30-40 specialists, and sometimes more
than 70.  Moreover, the size of projects often
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requires a number of firms to contribute risk
capital and arrange debt financing.  It is these
equity-contributing firms that are seen as the
building consortium, but construction
contractors usually remain outside the real
consortium, being members of the consortium
in name only, for marketing purposes.  
Banks and property developers with joint
contractual financial arrangements may
participate in the management and production
of projects by being partners in a construction
consortium. But they are only part of the
management and production of projects. The
actual building production is undertaken by a
supply chain of a number of firms. The
consortium forms a buffer between the public
sector clients and the technology and
resources used in the process.  In considering
the formation, nature and behaviour of
collaboration, and the risks associated with
joint ventures in construction, our approach is
to examine consortia in the context of their
building projects as a whole.
Research method
The method of study in this report is based on
a literature review reinforced with interviews
with a number of leading practitioners.
Interviews with selected practitioners from the
demand side and the supply side of consortia
have enabled us to develop clear explanations
and answers to the research questions.  The
interviewees represent a public sector client, a
developer, a bank, a financial consultancy, an
independent project manager, a construction
industry consultant, two main contractors, a
specialist subcontractor and a legal advisor.
The size of firms approached ranged from
small consultancies to relatively large firms,
such as Bovis Lend Lease, Symonds and
EMCOR Drake and Scull. However, the
responses of only one main contractor,
randomly selected from those interviewed, are
used in the tables to maintain a balance. The
views expressed do not necessarily reflect the
views of the firms and named organisations.
It is important to state that the interviewees
were not randomly selected and are not
necessarily representative of the industry as a
whole or even their particular specialisms.
However their views on consortia in
construction were not known before the
interviews took place. The interviews should be
seen as indicative of some opinions held in the
industry concerning consortia.  Far more
interviews would of course be needed to find
statistically significant results.  
The interviews were divided into an open
discussion of construction consortia and a
series of specific questions designed to
highlight particular issues.  The questions
covered two areas of interest; first, the setting
up and operation of consortia and second, the
management of risk and decision-making.
Eight full interviews were conducted, along the
lines indicated in Appendix A.  In addition, two
further interviews were carried out for the
purposes of dealing with some specific
outstanding issues.  While these additional
interviews are reported in the next section,
they are not included in the systematic, tabular
analysis shown in this section.
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Terminology and definitions
Several longer-term or strategic relationships
within the construction industry have emerged
in the last few years, including consortia, joint
ventures, partnering, special purpose vehicles,
strategic alliances and supply chain
management.  They are all examples of
construction and property syndicates.
Unfortunately the terms are often used loosely
or interchangeably by practitioners and this
leads to confusion over the definition of the
terms in practice.  Fortunately, the business
context invariably makes the meaning clear.
Nevertheless, it may be useful to propose
some operational definitions for these terms in
this report.
In this paper a consortium is defined as an
arrangement between several firms, in which
each firm contributes an equity stake in the
form of risk capital or payment in kind in order
to qualify as a member.  Remuneration of
consortium members may be calculated as a
share of the net profits of the consortium.  
A joint venture is characterised by a number
of firms collaborating on a project, or a number
of distinct projects, with a view to sharing the
profits, each firm being paid on the basis of its
agreed contribution in kind or in financial
terms. 
A partnering agreement involves a number of
firms, usually including the client, working co-
operatively to achieve a given output over one
or a number of projects.  Remuneration is
usually based on contract terms and
contribution to the work. 
A special purpose vehicle (SPV) is a
formal accounting and contractual
arrangement set up by one or more firms to
undertake a project or a series of projects
separate from the accounts of the firm(s)
comprising the special purpose vehicle.  Thus,
not all SPVs are consortia. However, consortia
invariably set up SPVs after being selected to
carry out specific work, and the members of
the consortium become shareholders of the
SPV.
The distinctions between consortia, joint
ventures and partnering arrangements are,
however, not as clear in practice where
variants and ad hoc arrangements necessarily
blur and confuse the boundaries of the terms
because of the need to tailor relationships in
response to the needs of each project.
Moreover, different interviewees interpreted
the terms differently, often depending on their
role in the property and development process.
Furthermore, not all construction firms working
closely together are necessarily working
together using any of the above arrangements.
Strategic alliances are formed by firms who
seek to work together on an on-going basis as
and when the members of the alliance win
work from different clients, provided the
specialist skills are required.  Another example
of closer working relationships between firms
in the construction industry appeared in a
briefing paper to the members of the
Specialist Engineering Contractors’ Group
(2003).  According to this briefing paper, Egan
(1998) suggested that the Defence Estates,
NHS Estates, the Highways Agency and other
public sector building procurers should
encourage the industry to form integrated
2 Construction consortia in general
10 l  RICS Research
project teams (IPT), which are not consortia.
IPTs should consist of all those involved with
the design, manufacture, assembly, installation,
operation and maintenance of the building.
These IPTs are thus intended to work closely
with the client over the whole process with a
view to achieving the customer’s business
objectives.  The SEC Group favour the
selection of IPTs based on best value rather
than lowest price.  This is seen as providing
participating firms with opportunities to provide
cost-effective solutions, enhance their own
profit margins and secure greater continuity of
work.
The Egan Report does not mention IPTs, as
such, but does discuss integrating the
(construction) process and the team around
the product, (Egan 1998: 16).  This integration
does not necessarily imply the formation of
new entities, such as consortia, to undertake
the work but does imply the need for greater
co-operation and understanding.  Supply chain
management is one response, which seeks to
reinforce the continuum of relationships
formed by working on a project through
greater communication and understanding
between all the parties involved, extending
upstream to include building component
suppliers, where necessary.
Types of consortia
Although some construction consortia may
appear to include contractors, many PFI bids
are assembled by developers and financiers,
only using a contractor to present a technical
input to the client.  In practice, the construction
contractors are kept at arm’s length and are
not full participating members of the
consortium.  There is no one form that defines
construction consortia.  On the contrary there
are several types of consortia: developer-
financial consortia, developer-financial-
contractor consortia, client-developer consortia
and single-type-organisation consortia.  Some
are involved in the essential commercial risk-
taking of projects while others are involved in
the building production process and some
combine commercial risk, construction and
service provision.  Variants of the consortium
concept also depend on the relative size, skills
and financial inputs of the various parties
needed to meet the specific demands of each
project, building or service requirement.
It is not always possible to distinguish ex ante
the type of consortium adopted in any given
project, especially where contractors are
involved at an early stage.  Contractors are
often used at an early stage to demonstrate
the existence of a team, but at this stage the
contractor may have made very little
commitment to the consortium.  According to
one contractor interviewed for this study, the
membership of consortia can change between
the initial presentation and the actual work on
site.  Much depends on the working
relationships between the actual people
forming the consortium. 
Figures 1 to 3 show the relationships of
different parties, where private sector finance
is involved, during three distinct phases
beginning with the initiation of the project, the
selection process and ending with the
procurement of the building and services.
Figure 1 shows a developer-led consortium
comprising a developer and a funder.  The
client is involved throughout the process but
remains separate from the consortium, which
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in turn is separate from the supply chain.
Developers and funders generally take
responsibility for marketing, financial control
and the commercial risk of undertaking the
project.  Contractors and facilities managers
and other suppliers, such as component
manufacturers, undertake the delivery of the
project or services according to their
contractual obligations.  Their risk is related to
production risk.
Following initiation of the project by the client,
a number of consortia may compete. The point
at which a preferred bidder is selected is
known as the financial close.  On reaching the
financial close the consortium moves from an
informal arrangement to forming an SPV.  In
Figure 1 the project is only concerned with the
procurement of a building or structure.  In
Figure 2 the consortium is engaged to provide
on-going services through an operating
company. This takes the form of a project
management company to which the operating
contract is transferred.
Figure 3 shows an example of a contractor-led
consortium.  However, it is usually a financial
division of the construction firm which is
engaged in discussions with the other
members of the consortium.  Consequently,
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Client
Initiation Selection of preferred bidder Procurement
Client
Initiation Selection of preferred bidder Procurement
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Initiation Selection of preferred bidder Procurement
Developers
Funders and bankers
SPV
Developers
Funders and bankers
SPV Operating companySa
le
Main contractor
Developers
Funders and bankers
SPV
Main contractor
Rest of supply chain
Figure 1: Developer-led consortium
Figure 2: Developer-led consortium selling or transferring the completed facility to an
operator
Figure 3: Joint venture with main
contractor partner
Entire supply chain inc. main contractor
Entire supply chain inc. main contractor
Time
the bid vehicle comprises the contractor’s
financial division, funders, the developer and
the main contractor.  After financial close
(when a bidder is selected) the SPV is formed
and the main contractor becomes both a
member of the SPV and a separate member of
the supply chain.  As the main contractor is
part of the joint venture, part of the supply
chain is included in the SPV, but not all.  The
contractor may be a shareholder of the SPV
but is also one of its suppliers.
Figures 1 to 3 illustrate the barrier formed by
construction consortia, because the entire
supply chain is separated from the client
making it difficult for contractors and clients to
communicate.  This is dealt with in greater
detail below.  
Relationships between firms in
consortia
Apart from the very smallest of jobs,
construction projects invariably involve a
number of firms, each providing specialist
knowledge and skills. In their advice to local
authorities the Office of the Deputy Prime
Minister (2003) recommend a number of
procurement routes or delivery models to
organise the construction process, including
partnering.  Partnering models include public
sector consortia, PFI and other forms of DBFO
contracts, partnering contracts, joint venture
companies and framework agreements
(incremental partnering). This proliferation of
terms leads to confusion but it is clear that
every construction project requires a relatively
large number of firms to collaborate in one
way or another in order to organise the supply
chain.
In their paper discussing a survey of supply
chains, Akintoye, McIntosh, and Fitzgerald
(2000) point out that although they found
improvements in planning and purchasing, a
number of barriers remained which inhibited
collaborative working.  They found a hostile
culture in the industry, a lack of commitment to
supply chain management (SCM) amongst
senior managers in the top construction
contractors they interviewed and
organisational structures which failed to
encourage collaboration.   They also felt there
was a general lack of knowledge and
understanding of SCM.  If SCM is taken as
one form of consortium in construction, in
which the contractors and suppliers co-
operate closely, it is clear that the managers of
firms have a first loyalty to their own
companies rather than the SPV or the other
firms in the supply chain.  We consider this
aspect of the behaviour of firms can best be
explained in terms of game theory, which is
discussed below.
Consequently, we believe consortia do not
necessarily lead to vertically integrated
processes in construction but simply add
another layer of contractual arrangements.
However, a greater degree of co-operation
between main and specialist contractors
would, according to Egan (1998), also reduce
the adversarial nature of the process.
However, in practice the underlying
relationships seem to have remained
essentially unchanged.
Nevertheless, it might be argued that
integrated teams might reduce duplication of
effort through improvements in communication
between the various parties, but at a cost and
RICS Research      l        13www.rics.org/research
Understanding construction consortia: theory, practice and opinions
this cost may be high, if firms take advantage
of preferences offered by being a member of
the integrated team.  It is the consortium
nature of construction, according to Pearce
(2003: 23), which creates major difficulties
between the various participants in the
building process and adds to the transaction
costs of delivering ‘consistent work patterns
and effective communication’.  
These difficulties may also vary depending on
the extent to which a consortium is an equity
alliance, with consortium members sharing
financial risk or a non-equity alliance. In a non-
equity alliance the firms simply collaborate
closely on a contract as in a supply chain or
partnering arrangement.  One area of difficulty
is trust between the participants. Langfield-
Smith (2005) examines trust within alliances
or consortia.  According to Langfield-Smith,
where there is a high level of uncertainty,
control is more easily achieved if firms have
equity at risk or have invested in the
consortium.  Langfield-Smith uses transaction
cost theory and concepts of trust to describe
goodwill trust and competence trust in the
context of construction consortia. Again
transaction costs are discussed in more detail
below.
Figures 4 to 6 show different kinds of
relationship between clients and members of
consortia and between the members of
consortia.  The terms ìarchitectî and ìengineerî
are used to indicate the different professional
inputs which may be included within a
consortium. Figure 4 shows the client outside
a consortium faced by a number of firms which
14 l  RICS Research
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Figure 4: Consortium showing external client and lines of communication between individual members
of a consortium and the client, with little or no communication between members of the supply chain
combine to negotiate with the client but do not
necessarily have close working relations with
the other members of the consortium.
Nevertheless the consortium presents a
unified approach to the client in order to win
the tender process although the arrangements
between the consortium members remain
informal until financial close.
In partnering arrangements, the firms agree in
principle to form a partnering arrangement at
the pre-tender stage.  If the consortium is
successful, the bidders are joined by the client.
Figure 5 illustrates the assumption that all
parties to the project, ranging from the client
to specialist contractors, are able to
communicate freely.  Only a relatively few
unimportant contractors may remain outside
the partnering arrangement.  This specific
arrangement appears to model the social
housing sector where Housing Associations
work with private sector developers and
contractors to build social housing and houses
for sale.  This also appears to be the model
assumed in the PPC2000: Project Partnering
Contract (Mosey 2000) .
PPC2000 requires the active involvement of
the client with full and open communication
between all parties.  As shown in Figure 5,
lines of communication are seen to exist
between all members of the partnering
agreement and especially between the
members of the supply chain and the client.
However, this mode of working is not common
in projects for public sector clients.  More
generally, in recent consortia which have been
established to serve public sector clients, the
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Public sector client
Developer Equity funder
Architect Engineer
Contractors in the
supply chain
Figure 5: Project Partnering Contract showing the client within the contract
arrangements and lines of communication between individual members of a
consortium and the client and between members of the supply chain
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client is not contractually part of the
consortium.
In Figure 6 the consortium lead bidder directs
the supply chain and negotiates with the client.
The lead bidder is usually the partner
contributing the greatest share of the bid
costs, a role usually taken by the developer,
contractor or facilities manager. The client thus
remains outside the consortium, which can
form a barrier between the client and the
supply chain.  
This pattern of consortium arrangement
appears to predominate.  In effect, the core of
the consortium is comprised of the lead
bidders, who are usually the developers with
their financial backers.  They take the initiative
with the client and act as a catalyst for the
supply chain, which they control.  The supply
chain is seen by the lead bidders as separate
from the core of the consortium.  In this model
the presentation of the consortium to the
client may include the contractors.  But, in
reality, the supply chain is at best an integrated
set of some of the suppliers (as illustrated in
Figure 6), working for the consortium lead
bidder.
Reasons for consortia in
construction
Construction consortia are an attempt by
property and construction firms to integrate
vertically, while remaining separate entities.
This contradiction in terms leads to many
misunderstandings and difficulties.
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Public or private
sector client
Consortium lead
bidder
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Figure 6: Consortium arrangement showing lines of communication between individual
members of a consortium including the supply chain but excluding the client
Nevertheless it is an attempt to respond to
market pressures caused by the size and
complexity of projects put to the industry that
require more than a specified building on
completion. The continuity of responsibility
after the construction phase, and into the
building-in-use phase, has led to a need or
desire to integrate the firms engaged in the
provision of the built environment.
This section deals with the reasons that firms
may choose to work in consortia rather than as
fully vertically integrated firms providing a full
construction and facilities management service
in-house.
Many consortia are formed in anticipation of
client requirements or in response to pre-
contract qualification criteria set by the client.
There may be several reasons for the belief in
the efficacy of consortia both from the clients’
point of view and from the point of view of the
members of the consortia. Indeed the Office of
the Deputy Prime Minister (2003: p35)
suggests a number of benefits to be gained by
local authorities from partnering arrangements,
defined as the ‘the creation of sustainable,
collaborative relationships with suppliers in the
public, private, social enterprise and voluntary
sectors to deliver services, carry out major
projects or acquire supplies and equipment.’
Although the ODPM do not say so in their
report, it could be argued that these
advantages may also be applied to consortia in
general. According to the ODPM report, these
benefits include better designed solutions,
integration of services for customers, access
to new and scarce skills, economies of scale
and scope and investment.  However, no
evidence is given in support of these
assertions in the report.
Size of firms relative to projects
One reason for the existence of consortia in
construction is given by Pearce (2003: 23),
who shows that one of the consequences of
the predominantly small size of specialist firms
in construction is that they must co-operate
with other small firms in order to undertake
relatively large building projects.  For firms
entering consortia-type arrangements the
shortage of in-house expertise and the high
cost of tendering can lead firms to collaborate
on projects. 
Risk management
A second reason for forming consortia in
construction is implied by Hayes, et al. (1987),
who discuss risk management from the
contractors’ point of view.  Although Hayes et
al. are not concerned with the issue of
consortia they discuss the issue of risk
management, arguing that an appropriate
contract strategy involves consideration of the
organisational structure needed to control both
design and construction and the relationship
between them.  The allocation of risk between
the various parties may not be best served by
traditional contracting arrangements in
undertaking high risk complex projects.  When
difficulties arise on site or when there are
major cost overruns it may be too late to avoid
the costs of delay, arbitration or litigation. They
advocate ‘active management of a risk by all
parties.’ (Hayes et al. 1987: 24)
We argue that the idea of active risk
management should be taken further in
proposing that a construction project should
begin with an analysis of the main objectives
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and risks in a project, followed by the
identification of roles and responsibilities, and
only then the identification of contractual
terms which bind the parties in legal
relationships.  This is the opposite of the more
usual practice of starting with a standard-form
contract and adapting it to suit particular
circumstances.  Consortia may be viewed as
organisational structures which take risk into
account at the earliest stages in a project
rather than waiting for problems to arise at a
later stage.  They therefore signal a clear move
away from traditional approaches to the
procurement of construction work.  An even
more direct approach to dealing with the early
identification of risk and design issues may be
provided by recent developments in partnering
arrangements as defined by the PPC2000
partnering contract which is discussed below.
The management of risk through the use of
consortia may be viewed as an industry
response to demand put to it by the public
sector and very large private sector clients.
Demand is put to the industry in the form of
project proposals. These projects tend to be
very large and complex.  At any one time
construction firms hold a portfolio of discrete
projects on which they are working. Only firms
of a certain capacity can undertake work over
a certain size or complexity.  When the
workload exceeds that size firms have no
option but to seek partners.  Otherwise the
exposure to risk represented by one project
contradicts the need to balance risk in the
firm’s portfolio of projects.  In this way the
relative commitment of any one firm to any
particular project is limited.  Few firms would
devote all of their resources to one project.
Nevertheless, each project still constitutes
both a source of revenue for the firm and a
threat to its profitability and even its continued
survival.  
Transaction costs
A third reason for consortia in construction
concerns the cost of transactions.  Williamson
(1975), Dietrich (1994), Winch (1989) and
Gruneberg and Ive (2000) refer to a number
of hidden expenses subsumed in the
transaction process.  Transaction costs are
caused by a number of different factors, which
impinge on decisions to buy or sell.  These
factors include ‘bounded rationality’ which
refers to the complexity and uncertainty
associated with decision making.  Secondly,
‘information impactedness’ refers to the limited
knowledge of the parties to a transaction
which denies them the ability to make correct
purchasing or selling decisions.  Williamson
refers to opportunism, which occurs whenever
firms take advantage of the information
impactedness of the co-transactor.  Winch also
notes the existence of asset specificity which
refers to specialised plant and other capital
equipment which may only occasionally be
required in unique circumstances. The problem
of costing the use of specialised plant in
unusual conditions allows firms to take
advantage of the lack of an established market
price.
Transaction costs occur even when consortia
are engaged.  One symptom of high
transaction costs associated with the Channel
Tunnel project, for example, was the fact that,
according to figures in The Sunday Times of 8
October 1989, there were approximately 400
men actually digging the tunnel and at least
800 people monitoring their progress in the
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headquarters of Transmanche Link, Eurotunnel
and Atkins/Setec, the Maitre d'Oeuvre.  There
were also several advisors to the 200 banks
funding the project. 
Nevertheless the formation of consortia may
be seen as a rational response to the
economic and commercial environment in
which firms operate.  Production processes in
construction are highly fragmented and
specialised.  Many separate firms must come
together in order to construct and operate
buildings.  These complex relationships are
determined by the markets for the various
services and components needed: design,
management, piling, steel erecting, cladding,
facilities management and many other
specialisms.  Before a contract can be signed
the product or service must be defined and
understood by both parties; both sides to the
deal must have confidence that the order will
be carried out and duly paid for.  A consortium
is often seen as one solution for discussing
and overcoming the uncertainties which may
arise and for facilitating negotiations with the
client.  However, in reality the process remains
fragmented; both within consortia and through
the supply chain.  Indeed, the discussions
between the consortium members and the
client rarely, if ever, include members of the
supply chain.
Nevertheless, von Branconi and Loch (2004)
provide a strategic checklist-framework for
dealing with transaction cost aspects which
may arise in project contracts before more
detailed considerations are discussed.  This
checklist consists of eight key areas, namely:
l Technical specifications, including use,
operation and maintenance
l Price, consistent with the technical
specifications allowing for contingencies
and profit margins
l Payment terms which recognise the cash
flow issues facing contractors
l Schedule with key milestones clearly defined
and understood
l Performance guarantees including those to
be undertaken by the client
l The period of warranties specifying the re-
performance of services and or the
replacement or repair of building defects 
l Limitation of liability to protect contractor by
providing a maximum exposure 
l Securities, such as bank guarantees, may be
used to offer a limited degree of assurance
to both or either party
Von Branconi and Loch (2004) argue that
these key areas are all sources of transaction
cost, with associated areas of uncertainty as
described by Williamson (1992), Jarillo (1988)
and Stinchcombe and Heimer (1985).  The
first four key areas specify the project while
the second four give assurances to both sides.
Jarillo (1988) discusses strategic networks of
partners, which require partners to agree their
goals through continuous collaboration and
interdependency.  As construction involves
discrete projects, with future collaboration
RICS Research      l        19www.rics.org/research
Understanding construction consortia: theory, practice and opinions
uncertain, if not unlikely, firms may be tempted
to take advantage of short term opportunities.
Stinchcombe and Heimer (1985) discuss a
possible solution to transaction costs caused
by clients’ changing requirements during a
project’s construction.  They suggest that the
relationships between the separate firms
should be organised much more along the
lines of relationships found inside
organisations.  A higher degree of co-
ordination and information-flow between the
firms should help a network of companies to
be more responsive to changes.  Indeed, the
practical operation of construction consortia
provides the very command structures,
authority systems, dispute resolution
procedures, standard operation systems and
incentive schemes that are called for by those
who seek to improve inter-firm collaboration.
Game theory
We have noted that project size and
complexity influence the way firms collaborate.
This response is an application of game theory.
According to Hargreaves, Heap and Varoufakis
(1995) the situation facing firms in the
construction and property sectors appears to
comply with the conditions of game theory.
These conditions are that there should only be
a limited number of players, that the players
expect the behaviour of the other players to be
based on a similar rationality to their own and
that the actions of one player impact on the
other players. 
Three types of game may be identified: hawk-
dove, co-ordination and prisoners’ dilemma.  In
the hawk-dove game, the share of profits is
unequal but all lose if the players fight. In the
game of co-ordination, if firms co-operate they
win but if they fight they all lose.  In the
prisoner’s dilemma, individual firms act in their
own interest but are worse off as a result.
In brief, different games are played out in
construction consortia.  The different scenarios
of winners and losers depend on the terms
and conditions affecting the project that each
consortium undertakes. The advantages of co-
operation may be the initial driver towards
setting up consortia.
It may be assumed by firms and organisations
that the members of a consortium combine to
their mutual advantage in a form of co-
ordination game.  However, unexpected events
may adversely affect all the parties and can
create conflicts, which lead firms into
confrontation, to their mutual detriment.  An
alternative game is presented by the prisoners’
dilemma in which the members of the
consortium each act in their own interests with
the result that the gains from the consortium
are lower than they would have been had the
firms been able to co-operate.  In the hawk-
dove scenario firms combine to form consortia
but some members are far more powerful than
others and are in a position to take advantage
of their position.  The result is that some firms
are worse off than they would have been, had
some members not taken advantage of their
relative strength.  From this brief summary of
applied game theory it is clear that conflict is
inherent even within consortia, even where co-
ordination games are being played, due to the
impossibility of predicting all the eventualities
that may arise.
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Conflict and dissent in the
production process
Consortia are formed by a number of diverse
organisations in order to undertake projects.
These projects are therefore shared amongst
the members of the consortium. However, Ive
and Gruneberg (2000) argue that members of
joint ventures do not share the same goals.  In
construction projects it is typical for each
member of the team to have distinct goals
often in conflict with the other members
(Murdoch and Hughes, 2000).  Moreover, not
all members of the team are of equal
importance or have equal
power (Greenwood, 2002). 
Nevertheless, a consortium
(as distinct from the project
itself) may be deemed
successful if participation in
the joint venture is
sufficiently profitable for
each member and each
member perceives his or
her reward to be
commensurate with his or
her contribution.  But
where firms collaborate,
these conditions are
almost impossible to find.
In the course of any
project, disagreements
between the parties
invariably emerge as
disputes arise over
payments for unplanned,
unexpected or unavoidable
additional work.  Of
necessity these disputes
must arise as each
organisation seeks to promote its own
interests within the context of a zero sum
game, in which one party can benefit only at
the expense of another.
This is not to say that conflict is necessarily
destructive.  Indeed conflict may be expected
and even welcomed as part of a creative
process or as a result of care, passion and
involvement by people representing different
firms.  For example, it is quite possible that a
quantity surveyor (QS) may be concerned with
controlling costs while the contractors are
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....conflict may be expected and even welcomed as
part of the creative process....
concerned with delivering a building according
to specifications.  If costs are escalating to the
point where cost overruns become inevitable,
then the conflict between the QS and the
contractor may be used to find a compromise
solution.
Management of conflict
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) suggest three
methods for dealing with dissent within
complex business organisations, namely:
confrontation, smoothing and force.  The
terminology of Lawrence and Lorsch can be
applied to disputes within
consortia. Confrontation
involves presenting the
relevant facts and seeking
a solution to a problem
through discussion and
negotiation.  Smoothing
relies on emphasising the
commonalities between
the parties to a dispute
and the costs of failure to
both parties.  The third
method is force and
depends on the relative
power of the firms in
dispute.  One of the
problems with firms
adopting force is that they may benefit
themselves at the expense of the totality of
the consortium.  Unfortunately, the use of
force in construction disputes is common.
Consortium members may use these three
methods to achieve their individual objectives
but the resolution of any argument depends on
the relative economic power of the
participants.  For this reason the use of
confrontation and force will tend to be more
effective than smoothing, as Lawrence and
Lorsch showed in their empirical work.  The
danger to be avoided is a tendency not to
leave forcing as the technique of last resort,
with the effect of impairing openness and trust
between the parties in a consortium.
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One of the problems
with firms adopting
force is that they
may benefit
themselves at the
expense of the
totality of the
consortium
The formation of consortia
Four of the eight interviewees questioned for
this report had long-term consortium
relationships, four did not.  Those who tended
to have long-term relationships, such as the
financial consultant, were not the major
speculative risk takers, whereas those who
took on the major financial risks, such as the
developer and funder, tended to rely on new
arrangements for each project. Consultants
may have long-term relationships with their
clients but as consultants would not generally
be expected to take on financial risks.  They
may however, hold a relatively small proportion
of the equity unless their commitment to the
consortium was based on payment following
final account, and success.  Consultants do not
generally invest any risk capital in consortia
with which they are involved. 
In Table 1 the reasons for entering into
consortia are given vertically according to each
point of view and grouped horizontally by
approximate type of reason. The main reasons
for entering into construction consortia,
whether on a one-off basis or on an on-going
basis, are related to a lack of skills in-house,
the need to engage specialists at an early
high-risk stage when projects were still highly
speculative, and the need to apportion risks
where they belonged.  Moreover clients often
require firms to enter into consortia
arrangements, which therefore improved the
likelihood of sales and increased their profit
margins.  From the point of view of public
sector clients, consortia provide access to
private sector funding as an alternative source
of finance to grants funded by the Treasury.
In Table 2, the circumstances that give rise to
the formation of consortia are shown vertically
according to each point of view and grouped
horizontally by approximate type of economic
driver. Consortia are often formed in response
to the complexity of development proposals,
while the size of projects also plays an
important role in the need for firms to
collaborate.  However, for banks, the drive to
participate in consortia comes from
competition in financial markets.  By joining a
consortium, banks can ensure a funding role
for themselves before the project leaders
require debt finance and approach financial
competitors.  One of the most important
conditions leading to the formation of
consortia is the set of requirements of the
client.  These may include specific terms and
conditions relating to environmental provisions
or a requirement to demonstrate and provide
sustainable urban communities.  Often these
requirements can only be met by close
collaboration of a number of firms, which then
respond by forming a consortium.
In the social housing sector, the Housing
Corporation Guidance Notes are frequently
used as the basis for standard arrangements.
However, in other construction sectors, while
many firms may not use a standard partnering
agreement, there is a general contract,
PPC2000, available through the Association of
Chartered Architects (ACA) and produced by
Trowers and Hamlin.  However, the contractual
arrangements do not determine the economic
interests of the members of consortia before
the consortium is formed.  Rather, contractual
agreements are determined by the economic
interests of the firms joining the consortium.  
3 Results from the interviews
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At the early stages of the formation of a
consortium, for example, banks rely on a loose,
ad hoc memorandum of understanding rather
than a rigid contract.  The same may be said of
developers.
Participants and roles in
consortia
The left hand column in Table 3 lists a number
of roles in the development process.  The
responsibility for each of these roles is
allocated according to the responses given
vertically by each of the interviewees. There is
little consensus concerning the allocation of a
number of responsibilities. The table is
indicative of a confusion of roles and a lack of
clear definition.  This lack of prescribed roles
may be one cause of conflict and
misunderstanding between firms within
consortia.  This is particularly the case with
regards to design, management and financial
control, where responsibility for the function
can be seen to range from the SPV, as a
whole, to different individual members.
However, responsibility for financial provision,
property development and actual construction
are more clearly defined.
Although it might be argued that consortium
arrangements such as SPVs might be used to
offload risks and responsibilities, the developer
can be seen as accepting overall responsibility
for almost every aspect of the development, in
return for the profit arising out of the project.
The public sector client was not informed
about the allocation of responsibilities in the
consortia working for the local authority.
Although developers may see themselves as
the main risk takers, according to the vertical
column labelled Developer in Table 3, the
consultants and contractors do not necessarily
share this view. As far as responsibility for
design, management and financial control
were concerned; the consultants considered
risks were shared between several parties.  In
fact, while overall responsibility may rest with
the developers, even the developer conceded
that those in the supply chain, the contractors,
took the construction risk.
The management of risk in
consortia
This apparent contradiction arises out of the
position of the developer who is responsible to
funders for the delivery of a building as far as
the funders are concerned but then the
developer offloads that responsibility on to the
contractors.  Similarly overall responsibility for
the project may be assumed by the project
lead banker, responsible for the financibility
and deliverability of the project because it is
the lead bank, which is responsible to the
underwriters of the finance.  Again the bank
protects its exposure to risk by ensuring the
developer takes responsibility for the delivery
of the project.  Thus each member of a
consortium fulfils both a supplier and a
purchaser role.  As a supplier, the member
undertakes a responsibility but then passes
the risk down the supply chain when it acts as
a purchaser of its own inputs.
In the light of the difficulties of allocating risk
and responsibilities after a consortium has
been formed, Table 4 shows the general
conditions sought by firms even before
entering a consortium and before contracts
are signed.  These terms and conditions are
shown vertically according to the point of view
of each interviewee and grouped 
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horizontally by approximate type of condition.
As the developer is usually the initiator of a
consortium, any terms and conditions agreed
by the parties prior to setting up a consortium
would be required as a concession made by
the developer.  The developer does not
generally begin the process with prior
conditions as such, and therefore the
Developer column in Table 4 is empty.  Table 4
also shows the diversity of requirements
partners might seek prior to joining a
consortium.
Before entering into a consortium commitment
with other firms, the project finance advisor
suggested that firms should seek access to
the management accounts of key partners.
This is seen as vital because of the
interdependence of the members of a
consortium and the shortcomings of the
historical nature of annual accounts.
Up to the point when a group of firms bidding
for a contract is given preferred bidder status,
partners are free to leave a consortium.  In the
early stages agreements may be based on
general understandings as far as the bank is
concerned.  Nevertheless contractors may
require more specific terms and
understandings such as a commitment to cost
reimbursement during construction, plus a fee
at financial close.  Even at the beginning of the
tender process, some firms, such as specialist
contractors undertaking detailed design work
and seek guarantees that they will be
appointed if the consortium wins the tender.
In the social housing sector one prerequisite is
that the consortium must be a local authority
(LA) preferred bidder.  Local authority
preferred bidders are housing associations and
their partners, who have pre-qualified for LA
grant support.  Local authorities may, for their
part, seek consortia, which are willing to
provide improvements in facilities and the
urban environment. 
Additional risks in consortia
It may be argued that consortia reduce risk.
Different firms working together with different
specialist skills, and more diverse management
expertise than any single firm, appear to offer
lower risk solutions.  However, far from
reducing uncertainty, consortia can also be
seen as increasing some firms’ exposure to
risk.  This apparent paradox can be resolved
by thinking in terms of overall risk reduction
and individual firms’ risk exposure.  While each
firm may experience additional risk factors,
many of these risks are part of a zero sum
game, in which the total risk to the client is
reduced.  For example, value engineering
implies that solutions can be found which
reduce the total cost of construction.  At the
same time, design changes brought about by
the value engineering exercise may mean that
one or more members of the consortium may
find their services are no longer required.
Table 5 shows the additional risks faced by
members of a consortium.  The major group of
identified risks is concerned with the
implications of working very closely with other
firms or organisations.  This area of risk
associated with consortia may be called
reputational risk.  Reputational risk is not
limited.  In any case all respondents stated that
limited liability makes no difference where
large projects are concerned.  In effect any 
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firm that fails to perform to the satisfaction of
its public sector clients will find it extremely
difficult to continue to supply services to public
sector organisations.  Indeed if any firm
consistently underperformed, it would find it
difficult to win more work, especially in the
public sector.  This reduces demand for the
firm’s output, depending on the ratio of public
to private sector work the firm carries out.
Even private sector clients may be deterred by
a firm’s tainted reputation.  
The interdependence of firms in consortia has
the potential to break up working relationships
between members, leading to a significant loss
in a firm’s turnover.  As consortia often work
closely with local authorities, an additional risk
facing firms is the lack of understanding of
commercial risk by many in the public sector.
Indeed political disputes between different
local authorities (where projects overlap into
neighbouring council territories) and between
local authorities and central government can
also lead to difficulties for consortia members.
A further risk for firms in consortia is the
changing capacity of fellow firms to fulfil their
obligations to the consortium.  Given that each
firm is engaged on a number of projects
outside the consortium and because of the
lumpiness of demand facing any one firm in
property and construction, each member firm’s
capacity available to the consortium can vary
widely over the life of a consortium.
There are other soft issues, for example the
tying up of resources, such as expensive
senior management, which interferes with the
smooth running of the organisation, especially
as there is no guarantee of success.  This
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A further risk for
firms in consortia is
the changing
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would also apply where no consortium is
formed but selection for many public sector
projects is not based on a single firm’s
strengths or offer, but on the combined
strengths and merits of the consortium as a
whole.  Success, for example from a
consortium funder’s point of view, is also
dependent on the selection process, which
may be based on design or facilities
management features and not just the banking
aspects of the bid.
Risks within consortia may be classed as
attributable and non-attributable risks.
Attributable risks may be taken by members
according to their skills and roles within the
consortium.  Non-attributable risks may be
taken by the consortium leader or the funder.
Although property developers may argue that
it is they, who accept responsibility for projects,
risks are borne by those in the weakest
negotiating position as they can be most easily
replaced.  Therefore those who offer non-
differentiated services are in the most
vulnerable position.  The firms in the weakest
negotiating position are the contractors and
their sub-contractors.  Perceived risk is taken
by the developers and constructional risk is
taken by the contractors.  Perceived risk, which
may be speculative or commercial risk, is
rewarded with the profits (net of construction
costs).  The constructional risk is therefore left
to contractors to price correctly and profitably
(while still winning the auction for work).
Risks are thus identified and allocated to the
firm best able to manage them.  That firm then
owns the risk.  Construction is seen as a high
risk, high volume and low-margin business.
The contractor is usually responsible for cost
overruns as construction contracts are usually
fixed price unless design changes are
delivered late.  If the design changes originate
in the consortium, the consortium would then
be responsible for the delay and additional
costs.  Otherwise, the bank, according to one
banker, still carries the main responsibility for
costs because it is the bank that provides
90% of the funding.  However, the bank
usually holds collateral security and manages
actual cash flow and, hence, controls the
contractual arrangements of the constructor or
facility manager.  Risks other than construction
risks may be seen as residual risks. Residual
risks are taken or assumed in proportion to the
consortium shareholdings of partners, or by
the lead bidder.  Alternatively, the client may
carry the risk rather than waste or lose time.
Reduced risks in consortia
Nevertheless, several interviewees pointed out
a number of factors relating to consortia,
which actually reduce the level of risk, because
they reduce uncertainty in the process (see
Table 6).  This is partly achieved by making
use of a broader knowledge base than could
be afforded by one organisation working alone.
Risks are also reduced because consortia can
make use of the experience of the different
partners who may have worked on similar
projects.
The sharing of bidding costs and the
spreading of financial risk over a number of
firms and organisations also reduce risks
faced by members of a consortium.  The larger
the asset base the easier and cheaper it is to
raise finance, assuming all else remains the
same.  As a number of firms combine to form 
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a consortium the asset base may be enlarged
to allow for greater access to funding at lower
rates of interest and therefore lower risk.
Consortia allow members additional exit routes
if they wish to leave a project by finding a
suitable and acceptable replacement without
necessitating the abandonment of the project.
Disputes, it was claimed by one interviewee,
never arise out of quality, safety or programme
issues.  They may arise out of differences in
interpretation of the contract or over money.
When disputes arise in consortia, every effort
is made to resolve them without recourse to a
higher body.  This is a convincing argument, as
most managers would wish to avoid resorting
to their superiors or their company directors to
resolve a dispute for them.  Resorting to such
action would imply a personal failure to
manage the work, which may indirectly
adversely affect an individual’s career
prospects.  This pressure on managers arises
because joint working in consortia entails a
dispute resolution process based on a
hierarchy of procedures, the first being an in-
house Principals’ Body, comprising the
directors or senior representatives of the
consortium.  Failure of the Principals’ Body
may lead to adjudication, followed by
arbitration and finally litigation.  Both
contractors interviewed agreed that no
disputes had reached litigation from any co-
operative ventures, in which they had
participated.  They do not tend to get that far.
From several of the interviews, it emerged that
decision-making in consortia depends on
effective leadership and delegation.  Someone,
who has to have the confidence of all the
parties, has to run the project.  One strong
individual persuades the others and this
produces the appearance of consensus.
Decisions are open, but are networked in
advance.  The client is informed of these
decisions only when necessary.  However, the
public sector client interviewed for this report
stated that decisions were rarely passed on to
the client body and often were only
communicated informally or by chance at
meetings.
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Overview of responses
This section of the report describes the setting
up of consortia and their operational practices
from the point of view of the different
participants in the development and
construction process.  Each point of view is
based on an interview with an individual
representing a specific role.  The order of
presentation reflects the development process
although it is also possible that contractors
may take the lead in forming consortia.
Nevertheless we begin with the client’s
perspective.  The developer and banker then
form the core of the consortium together with
examples of financial consultants and property
advisors.  The main contractor and a specialist
contractor form part of the supply chain, which
delivers the building or structure to the
consortium.  We end with a legal point of view
and a discussion of PPC2000.
The contributions below show that the
interviewees present a number of useful
perspectives.  First, they reinforce the point
made earlier; that consortia tend to be formed
only when firms have little alternative.  Indeed,
one interviewee stated it was not his firm’s
strategy to enter into consortia agreements.
Consortia are not seen as vehicles for
improving collaborative working.  Again, it was
stated that best practice in construction does
not depend on consortia.  This is not to say
that consortia inhibit best practice.  Firms rely
on their bargaining strengths even within
consortia arrangements.
Influence and control within consortia are
based on financial commitment and equity
share.  Even where contractors may be
deemed to lead consortia, further enquiry may
reveal that the contractor’s financial input and
control is provided by a property, investment or
development arm of the same company.  The
examples or case studies given by
interviewees tended to support the view that
consortia are marketing and financially driven
arrangements which take on commercial and
reputational risks. A separate supply chain of
contractors takes on the production risk, which
may extend to the provision of services after
completion of construction.  In some cases a
contractor may be a member of both the
consortium and the supply chain, in which case
it is possible for the contractor to be sued by
the consortium of which it is a shareholder.
A public sector client’s point of
view
The public sector client saw the aim of a
consortium as a group of companies brought
together for a particular purpose (for example
constructing a building), because of the
expertise of the different firms.  In joint
ventures, the partners take equal liability.  In
consortia the consortium takes the financial
risk and manages the supply chain.
As a public sector client, the interviewee would
have welcomed the opportunity to establish
long-term relationships with construction
consortia.  But this did not arise, partly
because many in the public sector have a fear
and distrust of the profit motive.  Nevertheless,
public-private partnerships enable the public
and private sectors to share problems and
develop closer working relationships.  This
enables the public and private sectors to play-
off each other to their mutual benefit.  Longer-
term partnerships with the private sector could
4 Contrasting views of consortia
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be developed in return for local authority sites.
This arrangement takes advantage of the
private sector skills of managing procurement,
while the government sector remains
accountable to the public.
Because many civil servants tend to have little
direct knowledge or experience of commerce,
the public sector does not always have the
necessary skills in managing procurement.
The public sector is more concerned with non-
commercial issues, such as public service
provision and accountability, than commercial
considerations.  It is, therefore, relatively poor
at making commercial decisions.  The public
sector cannot take on financial risks such as
cost overruns, late delivery and unresolved
disputes.  As a result the public sector is
willing to pay for the private sector to take the
risks associated with projects.  Nevertheless
the private sector tries to put the financial risks
back on to the public sector.  Consortium
decisions were often not conveyed to the
client, but were informally communicated by
chance in meetings between the client and the
consortium.  Distrust is played on by advisors.
In spite of these difficulties in public-private
sector collaboration, there is a need for a leap
of trust.
These issues indicate that far from being an
open method of procuring a building or
structure, it is possible for members of a
consortium to obscure important details of a
project from the client.  This highlights the
self-interested behaviour of the parties in the
construction process, allowing for predictable
opportunistic transaction costs and game
theory outcomes of the hawk-dove variety.
A developer’s point of view
From a developer’s point of view, a consortium
that includes a contractor increases the risk
for the developer and its financial backers,
because the arrangements blur responsibilities
for delivery when a contractor is included in
the consortium.  To developers, entering the
world of the contractor is like entering a black
box.  There are simply too many opportunities
for contractors’ costs to rise at the expense of
the developers’ profits.
Developers are prepared to take commercial
risk only provided they are in a position to hire
or dismiss the other members of the team.
Indeed although the relationship with other
members of the consortium may be closer
than in non-joint ventures, joint venture
organisations work best when there are
several projects to be undertaken.  With the
developer in a position to remove partners
from the team, the developer has a sanction if
things go wrong.  At the same time there is
less chance of contractors behaving
opportunistically if they are at risk of losing
further participation in the joint venture.  This
applies similarly to subcontractors.
These comments illustrate the divisions that
exist within consortia, showing the level of
distrust of developers towards contractors,
their relative negotiating strengths and their
attitudes towards risk.
A funder’s point of view
Consortia are seen as business opportunities
but not ones to be carried out by a single firm
or funder.  From the point of view of the
partners in a consortium, the main aim of
setting up a consortium is to win the bid.
36 l  RICS Research
Once this has been achieved each member of
the consortium receives a contract and the
bank funds the project.  Consortia represent
the integration of the vertical value chain by
working together in collaborative teams. The
consortium whole is greater than the sum of
its parts. It can be argued that one of the
benefits of working as a consortium on a
construction project is that it improves value
management. It also increases the reliability of
the bid price compared to many recent public
sector directly commissioned works, though
this may not necessarily always be the case.
Contractors may see participating in consortia
as a construction market segment. Consortia
bidding for NHS and local authorities’ projects
may be contractor-led but usually contractors
are brought in at a later stage.  Perhaps as
much as 70% of consortia are not led by
contractors.  However there may be a trend
towards contractors becoming more involved.
There is no incentive for contractors to invest
in consortia for the long term, if they only have
a construction contract.  Therefore, where
contractors lead, the contractor member is
often a facilities management firm, which may
be a subsidiary of a building contractor.  The
facilities manager then has an on-going
interest in the operating phase of the project.
As far as funders are concerned, the
distinction between developers and
contractors is blurred in practice.  The
developer accepts responsibility for the
delivery of the project, which is then
undertaken by building and/or facilities
management contractors.  Consequently the
contractors are responsible if they do not
deliver as required.  To the funder, the risk of
poor performance is passed on to the other
parties in the consortium, regardless of their
particular roles in the process.
A financial advisor’s point of view
In financial consortia the developer acts as
fund manager and a bank as funder.  However,
funders are often brought in far too late,
because funders are usually involved only after
the tender stage, which follows the initial
proposal stage.
In a delivery-plus model consortium, there is a
developer, a funder and a facilities manager.
Together they form an SPV.  Construction
contractors are only on the supply chain and
have a client-supplier relationship with the
SPV.  The construction side is kept at arm’s
length by the SPV, although the SPV may
insist on an open book condition in the
contract allowing the SPV to monitor the
construction phase closely.
One of the problems for lenders, and a limit on
their willingness to form an SPV with a
contractor or a developer, is that there are no
credit ratings in the construction industry or
property sector.  The reasons for the lack of
credit ratings are:
1. Property companies’ valuations depend on
the value of their land banks.  This means
their asset base is difficult to value and
varies over time.
2. There is no tradition of joint ventures
between lenders and developers.  There
appears to be an innate conservatism on the
part of lenders to form partnerships with
developers.
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3. SPVs tend to be relatively static contractual
arrangements whereas developers are
essentially opportunistic firms requiring
flexibility to respond to changing
circumstances and market conditions.
Construction contractors have traditionally
been even more difficult to value than property
companies.  However, Standard and Poors
(2004) have recently recognised the changes
brought about by the PFI undertakings of
contractors, which produce income streams.
These income streams create capital values
and form an asset base, which can be
identified and associated with construction
firms.  Nevertheless, from a financial point of
view, significant fragmentation within consortia
remains between the financial inputs and the
commercial and speculative functions and the
industrial processes of constructing buildings.
A housing project co-ordinator’s
point of view
Housing associations are regulated by the
Housing Corporation.  Consortia are formed to
reduce competition between housing
associations and to enable them to spread
risk.  A consortium can initiate without
identifying a developer partner, using
conventional contracts etc., whereas partnering
involves all the parties in a risk sharing
arrangement.  Housing associations have a list
of selected consultants and contractors they
work with.  This is a pre-requisite of partnering
working, often using a standard set of
arrangements based on the Housing
Corporation Housing Methodology plus a JCT
Partnering contract.  They may also use the
JCT Design and Build contract as a variant of
the traditional building contract.
A consortium in the housing sector may,
therefore, be defined as a group of like-
minded organisations, which combines to
provide affordable housing.  The consortium
decides demand and the appropriate mix of
rent, joint ownership and sale.  Consortia may
include developers who offload their
commercial risk by building social housing.
This creates economies of scale for the private
and public sectors.  The public sector
involvement is based on the public investment
funds made available to housing associations
through the Housing Corporation.
Consortia in the social housing sector tend to
follow patterns determined by the Housing
Corporation and regulations and local authority
practices.  Because of the more repetitive
nature of the housing market these patterns of
working distinguish consortia in the housing
sector from those in other parts of the
construction industry.
A contractor’s point of view (1)
Consortia which may be led by contractors
(often Design-Build-Finance-Operate) can
offer a wider function than purely providing the
built element.  Consortia are needed to
manage risk.  With the early involvement of
contractors there is a better handle on risk in
PFI and regeneration projects.  Consortia can
be used to bridge public and private sectors
e.g. English Partnerships, London Borough of
Barnet.  In one scheme, for example, as well as
the involvement of the local authority, there
was one contractor and two housing
associations one of which, was the lead bidder
for the 3,400 homes and amenities, which
were being provided over a period of 14 years.
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Within long-term consortia agreements,
regulators may be used to mediate the mix of
social housing and homes for sale.  The
regulator is based on the excess of house
price inflation of 1.1% per annum over the
construction cost index. The more profitable
the scheme in terms of homes for sale the
more social housing can be provided.
As much as 60% of contractor’s turnover may
be through consortia, which provides them
with a degree of continuity of work.  As a
result people with broader high-level
management skill sets are being taken on
directly by contractors.  However, packages for
subcontractors remain, which implies that the
actual building production process may remain
detached from and is not necessarily affected
by the existence of a consortium.
SPVs are formed to bid and deliver a project.
The composition of a consortium can change.
The partners can change.  Nevertheless the
returns to the members of a consortium are
based on a formula for the purpose of sharing
out the dividends.  One such formula may be
based on the model shown in Figure 7.  In this
model costs are seen as including construction
costs, fees, the costs of marketing and a
developer’s profit.
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100% local government
Developer’s profit (say 7%)
Prime cost of sales (sales office)
Fees in construction cost
Construction cost
30%
developer
70% other parties
Below line
Cap on
leverage
Figure 7: Model of distribution of consortium profits
As there is much more shared risk, the profit
element should be lower (on the developer’s
account).  The developer may accept a base of
only 7% profit margin on costs below the line
and a share of the profits above the line,
instead of calculating a 20% developer’s
margin at the beginning.  Below the line is
seen as the cost of delivery.  Above the line an
upper cap is set on profits.  Profits above the
cap belong to the local authority.  Profits above
the line and below the cap are shared
between the developer and the other members
of the consortium, according to agreed
percentage shares, say 30 per cent to the
developer and 70 per cent to the other
members of the consortium..
A Contractor’s point of view (2)
In the early to mid 1990s the recession in the
construction industry pushed firms towards
working in consortia, further encouraged by
PFI projects for the public sector.  Contractors
decided to lead consortia in order to protect
their business.  For one contractor, Bovis Lend
Lease, working within a consortium
represented an investment interest as well as
providing construction work and facilities
management.  Winning construction work was
the major driver for contractors in consortia
because construction provided the earliest
returns.  Government also wanted operators to
run the built facilities.  However, the returns on
facilities management were too long-term and
contractors were not geared to taking on long
term investments.  Nevertheless, many
consortia are construction led.
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Bovis Lend Lease is not typical but not unique.
For example, Balfour Beatty is similar, as is
Carillion in the PFI projects the latter
undertakes, also providing facilities
management, while Amey have tended to
concentrate on facilities management.  In
Figure 8, Bovis Construction is shown as a
wholly owned subsidiary of Bovis Lend Lease
which in turn is a wholly owned subsidiary of
the Lend Lease Corporation.  The Lend Lease
Corporation also owns Bovis Lend Lease
Holdings.  Bovis Lend Lease may embark on a
consortium arrangement with the support of
Bovis Lend lease Holdings.  They insert a
condition in the Memorandum of
Understanding that Bovis Construction be
appointed to undertake the construction work.
The Memorandum of Understanding becomes
the Shareholders’ Agreement at financial
close, if and when the consortium becomes
the preferred bidder.  However, Bovis
construction is a separate business entity from
Bovis Lend Lease. 
Examples of consortia in which Bovis Lend
Lease play a leading role are Catalyst
Healthcare Management Ltd in the health care
market and Focus Education Ltd in the
education market.  Specific projects involving
Bovis Lend Lease include the Treasury
Building where Stanhope was the developer
with a 42.5% equity stake; Chestertons
undertook the property management function
with an equity share of 15% and Bovis Lend
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Lend Lease Corporation
Bovis Lend Lease Holdings Bovis Lend Lease 
Bovis Construction Facilities Management Business Unit
Figure 8: Part of the structure of Lend Lease Corporation
Lease construction and facilities management
with 42.5% of the equity.
The Catalyst consortium currently has 3
operational projects, 3 in construction and 2 at
preferred bidder stage.  In the Minutes of the
Select Committee on Health 15.11.01, the
Chief Executive, Catalyst Healthcare, stated
that Catalyst Healthcare Management Limited
was a subsidiary of Bovis Lend Lease Limited.
It had three functions: to lead and coordinate
the PFI bids for Bovis Lend Lease and its
consortium partners; to act as agent for the
project company investors to manage the
project on their behalf, and to facilitate the
development of best practice and the transfer
of knowledge.
Both the Bank of Scotland and Société
Générale originally took equity stakes in the
Catalyst consortium but the latter is no longer
involved. Facilities management is provided by
ISS. The equity stake held by Bovis Lend
Lease is 50%, the rest being shared between
the other members of the consortium.  A 50%
equity share is the maximum percentage Lend
Lease are usually prepared to invest in an
SPV.  This compares to the industry norm of
between 10 and 25% equity shares in an SPV
being held by the contractor member.
SPVs may be recourse or non-recourse.  A
recourse SPV implies that the risk is borne by
the SPV.  With one point of responsibility the
clients need not pursue member firms
individually.  The firms in the SPV must then
settle claims internally within the consortium.
In a non-recourse SPV, the risk passes
through the SPV and is borne by the firms
individually. When a non-recourse SPV is set
up interest rates charges are reduced.  The
debt equity ratio of non-recourse SPVs can be
in the region of 80:20, whereas a recourse
SPV’s debt equity ratio is more often 90:10.
Contractor and management
consultancy’s point of view
As managers of the construction process, the
management ethos at one broadly-based
management consultancy may be summarised
as:
l questioning practice - seeking
improvements, 
l leadership and involvement of key senior
people - Head of Engineering, Architects,
and
l motivation of staff through customer
feedback, published results of effort,
employment based on risk and reward.
This firm did not enter into shared equity risk.
There was no need to engage in consortia for
the purposes of developing best practice.
However, where the cost of bidding was
excessive or where expertise and senior
management was in short supply, a need to
form a consortium may arise.
Some examples of recent working
arrangements of this firm are given below:
l A head office was built by a private
developer, who appointed a contractor and
this management consultancy. The
contractor and the management consultancy
had made a joint bid to the developer. The
contractor took on the financial risk and the
consultancy provided the expertise.
42 l  RICS Research
lWith another office project, the management
consultancy provided a ‘one-stop shop’
appointing the architects and undertaking
the construction lump sum contract.  The
consultants acted as both project manager
and main contractor.
l A local authority appointed the
management consultancy under a five year
Framework Agreement to provide new build
schools, adult care centres, fire stations and
other county public buildings.  The role of
management consultants was to project
manage taking responsibility for
professional services such as design and
quantity surveying.  Under the Framework
Agreement contractors had to pre-qualify
and this enabled the management
contractors to reduce the number of
contractors in the supply chain.  The
selection of contractors then depended on
the size of the project.  The county council
took the commercial risk.  The management
consultants had no equity risk in the
projects.  It would therefore appear that the
use of management consultants was
necessitated by the lack of local authorities’
in-house staff and expertise rather than a
lack of funding.
A specialist contractor’s point of
view
The purpose of a consortium is to meet the
total needs of the client.  In principle forming a
consortium allows communication of clients’
needs to subcontractors, which improves client
satisfaction.  Most consortia are put together
for the public sector or a few private sector
clients e.g. BAA.  A consortium is usually set
up in conjunction with an open and
transparent partnering agreement.  To achieve
this, the consortium requires partners to have
common aims and objectives.  All the
constituent parts should make up a coherent
whole.  Although the arrangements can be
loose or formal, there should be a culture
embodying a belief in the aims of the project
and a belief in the other members of the team
and the value they bring.  Moreover, there are
three elements that form or glue a consortium.
They are mutual risk, trust and money.  But
these elements can also create major friction
within consortia.
The builder and the operator may or may not
be part of an SPV but the client often
assumes builders and operators are part of the
consortium.  The main contractor and the
mechanical and electrical (M&E) contractor
may have a good relationship, but the M&E is
not usually part of the consortium.  The M&E
contractors, therefore, have no direct access
to, or relationship with, the funders or
financiers.  The specialist firm is in the supply
chain but not in the consortium.  The client
liaises with the SPV, which assumes
responsibility for legal and financial aspects.
The SPV then commissions a contractor for
the construction phase and a facilities
manager or operator (if required) during the
building-in-use phase.  Both the contractor
and the operator are seen as leading their
supply chains to the SPV.  The supply chains
extend to the subcontractors and material and
component suppliers.  In this model, the SPV
acts as a client of both the contractor and the
facilities manager, even though both may be
shareholders in the SPV.  The SPV therefore
comes between the client and the supply
chains, which actually undertake the work.
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Specialist sub-contractors can, therefore,
experience the same difficulties encountered
in many construction projects whether they
involve consortia or not.  The early stages are
based on trust with builders, but after winning
a tender the main contractor may ask for a
price reduction.  In one instance, the
interviewee was asked for a £3m reduction on
an £18m tender and this concession was
followed with very late payments by the main
contractor.  Consequently the firm, which is a
subsidiary, is no longer allowed by its parent
company to join consortia on the basis of trust
alone.  The extent of reliance on good faith
forms part of the risk analysis of any given
project.
A lawyer’s perspective 
There is no single definition of the term
‘consortium’.  A consortium may or may not be
formed of like organisations, such as all-
architect members or all-contractor members,
and it may or may not be jointly or severally
liable.  The formation of a consortium would be
unnecessary, if a client did not want any
involvement in the construction process.  The
contractor would simply undertake all the work.
A consortium, which is separate from the
client, can lead to distrust.  One measure to
overcome this distrust is a single open
contract for all team members.  This pre-
contract requirement would not only reduce
the inherent distrust which arises when a
number of firms are needed to work together
on construction projects, but it would also
reduce the time spent on negotiations.  If a
client participates in the building team, the
arrangement may be seen as conventional
partnering or a consortium, which included the
client-developer.  This distinction would
depend on the equity nature of the alliance.
More direct involvement by the public sector in
projects is indeed encouraged by the ODPM
(2003).  The National Procurement Strategy
recommends local authorities to streamline
their procurement processes, by eliminating
unnecessary red tape and reducing
dependency on external advisors.  While the
elimination of unnecessary red tape may be
difficult to achieve, a reduction of dependency
on external advisors can be arrived at by
employing more professional staff directly.
PPC2000 (recently amended), is the only
multi-party contract covering the entirety of the
project up to the end of defects liability.  The
aim of PPC2000 is to form a complete team
for a project by including the client: to
integrate the team.  The integration of the
team implies that there are no gaps or
duplication between team members’ roles.
The integration of the process implies
buildability and affordability.  This process of
integration includes the selection of a
constructor and specialists at an early stage,
which aids contractual programming, value
engineering, an environment for risk
management, and open book pricing.
While PPC2000 is project specific, partnering
can also be on a longer term basis.  Firms can
rise above corporate self interest which may
be seen to be short-sighted.  If only for
marketing purposes, firms want to prove their
own credentials, establishing mutual duties of
care under PPC2000 rather than sheltering
behind the limited liability of a separate
consortium joint venture vehicle.
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PPC2000 may be seen as a standard form of
contract used as an alternative to a client-
excluded consortium arrangement.  PPC2000
has been used extensively with only a very few
variations occasionally being inserted and
these have mainly been concerned with minor
issues, such as the time scale used for
decisions.
The PPC2000 partnering agreement itself is
risk neutral.  Firms would carry these risks in
any case.  Risks are borne by all the
participants individually.  Responsibilities within
a consortium depend on the project.  There
are no additional risks associated with the
PPC2000.  There have been no objections by
funders, constructors or professional indemnity
insurers.  There is no extra liability.  Through
partnering arrangements, PPC2000 allows for
more direct means of recovery and more ways
of influencing the other members of the
project team.  This leads to improved
communication.  This, in turn, reduces risks
such as problems associated with
programming, or problems arising out of
misunderstanding.  There is an option in
PPC2000 which permits the dividing up of
liability irrespective of blame but this clause
has not as yet been taken up.
A Core Group or Principals’ Body, which
decides major issues, is included in the
arrangements of PPC2000.  Meetings of the
Core Group may be called by the Client
Representative, if requested by any of the
Core Group members, unless a dispute can be
agreed or a decision can be reached without a
formal meeting.  Under PPC2000 there have
been very few adjudications.
Comments on interviews
It has been claimed that PPC2000 has
succeeded in bringing disparate construction
firms together and forged good working
relationships in the supply chain.
Nevertheless, there is resistance to change
among industry leaders and clients, largely due
to low profit margins and high risk associated
with large schemes.  The reluctance of project
initiators to use or trial PPC2000 may be more
due to this inherent conservatism coupled with
the traditional characteristics of the
construction industry rather than to the
perceived effectiveness of the new contract.
The PPC2000 is concerned with supply chain
management before and during the
construction phase.  However, many public
sector projects now extend beyond that stage
into the building-in-use phase, which is not
covered by the current versions of PPC2000.
For this reason PPC2000 remains an
alternative approach to developer-led consortia
for procuring public sector projects, but one
that may prove fruitful in the future when the
PPC concept is developed to include post-
construction activities.
The JCT 2000 partnering contract is a non-
binding add-on to JCT contracts such as the
JCT 98 with contractor’s design, which spells
out requirements and obligations, whereas the
PPC2000 is more based on mutual trust and
transparency.  However, partnering may not
always be an attractive option.  Depending on
the state of the market, contractors may take
advantage of the terms and conditions of
PPC2000 to exploit their dominant position
within the partnership, especially if margins are
being squeezed.
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The following observations summarise the
research reported here:
l Consortia in construction are formed as
marketing vehicles for developers and
funders, who use contractors and project
managers to provide the buildings and
services.  This is an important aspect of
securing certain types of work.
l The roles and relationships within consortia
are structured around risk.  The members of
consortia share commercial and reputational
risks but otherwise adopt traditional roles
within consortia-type arrangements.
l The motive of firms in construction
consortia is to win a share of major jobs
which would otherwise involve prohibitively
high tendering costs.
l The working practices of firms in consortia
tend to be ad hoc.  The consortium
arrangement itself does not necessarily lead
to closer working relationships between the
member firms.  However, the personal
relationships between the key members of
the consortia are an essential component for
the success of a project.
l Consortia arrangements enable firms to take
advantage of the expertise of fellow
consortium members especially at the
tendering stage.  This contributes well to the
mobilisation of productive resources, usually
paid for on the promise of the opportunity to
win large amounts of work.
l The main source of risk and conflict is the
reliance on other members of the
consortium to deliver.
l Integrated supply teams are not the same
thing as consortia.  An integrated supply
team does not necessarily share an equity
risk in contrast to consortia, which do.
From the review of the literature and our
interviews, we have concluded that
construction consortia are primarily marketing
vehicles, which form barriers between the
client and the firms that carry out the work.
Consortia do not in themselves add value to
the construction production process.
Consortia are, in general, separate entities
from the construction supply chain.  In the
supply chain there is current evidence that
firms are seeking closer working relationships.
This may be as much to do with changing
technologies as it is to do with a general
desire to improve the working relationships
within the construction industry.  These
changes mean that specialist firms have to be
brought in to the design process at an early
stage in order to be effective.  As a result,
although the firms remain separate, they are
learning to co-operate as long as all of the
parties can benefit from value engineering
exercises.
Another change taking place in the
management and organisation of the supply
chain is the introduction and development of
the PPC2000 arrangement, which implies that
the client takes an active part in the problem
solving processes and continues to participate
5 Conclusions
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in the building team during the
construction phase.  However not all
consortia adopt PPC2000 or even
similar arrangements.  Instead the
construction process remains largely
unaffected by the use of consortia.
While there are clear advantages for
firms and clients operating under
consortia arrangements, the case
remains to be made that consortia
offer anything new as a mode of co-
operation over and above
conventional ways of working.
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.....the case remains to be made that consortia
offer anything new as a mode of co-operation
over and above conventional ways of working
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Main business activity of firm and role in construction process
Personal role in construction process
Approximately how many people engaged directly by the firm
Approximate turnover of firm
1. Do you have any long term consortium arrangements? (Yes/no.)
2. Why do you enter into these agreements? 
3. Under what circumstances do you form a consortium? 
4. Do you have a standard partnering agreement? (Yes/no.)
5. Which members of the consortium are responsible for: 
l Financial provision
l Design
l Actual construction
l Management
l Financial control
l Other roles
6. Are there terms and conditions you seek in the negotiations before entering a
consortium?
7. What are the additional risks of being in a consortium?
8. What risks are reduced by the use of consortia?
9. Which parties in a consortium should carry these respective risks? 
l Cost overruns
l Late delivery
l Design changes
l Unresolved disputes
l Other
Appendix A: Interview questions
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10. Why should they carry these risks?
11. Who carries these respective risks at present?
12. What difference does limited liability have on the behaviour of firms in consortia
compared to firms outside and do you have any examples of firms taking advantage
of their limited liability to avoid financial difficulties? 
13. What disputes if any have arisen? 
14. How are decisions taken? 
l Jointly following discussion at regular meetings
l By one party (developer, bank, contractor, architect, other decides,
l Consultation with all parties concerned
l Ad hoc discussion.
l Other
15. How open are the decisions - is the client informed? (Yes/no) If so, rough
percentage.
16. How open are the decisions - are decisions circulated in any form? (Yes/no.) If so
how?
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